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THE PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTION STOCK 
MARKET CYCLE 
THEORY: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR 
FUTURE INVESTMENT 
OPPORTUNITIES 
Michael Krauss 
Few aspects of stock market folklore have intrigued academics and investment 
advisors more than the "presidential election stock market cycle theory." The 
theory integrates the political nature of economic activity with its effects on the 
stock market and basically contends that presidents have learned how to fine-
tune the economy for political gain. 
According to this hypothesis, upon election a president usually tries to in-
troduce unpopular economic programs which often involve spending cuts or tight 
money and thereby induces a deflationary phase in the business cycle. Conversely, 
as the next election approaches, the President (with the help of an accommodating 
Federal Reserve System) attempts to apply expansionary monetary and fiscal 
policies, leading to an economic boom. The rationale is that a strong economy in 
the first half of a president's term serves no political purpose because of the short 
term memories of voters. On the other hand, stimulating the economy in time 
for the November presidential election enhances the chances of an incumbent 
party's victory (Hoey, 1978, p. 194). 
According to the theory, the stock market, which is a leading indicator of 
economic activity, consequently tends to fall during the two years after a presiden-
tial election and tends to rise strongly during the two years prior to a presiden-
tial election (Hoey, 1978). Although students of the theory have noted traces of 
a four-year presidential cycle dating back to the 1800s, the cycle has been most 
evident since 1960, when an active macroeconomic policy became firmly established 
(Hoey, 1982, p. 3). Furthermore, the cycle has been observed during the terms 
of Democrats and Republicans alike. 
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The purpose of this paper is to investigate further the presidential stock market 
cycle and, in particular, to examine the potential link between the cycle and 
economic policy. In addition, we will examine the implications of the theory for 
investor strategy. Investment strategies based on the cycle have often proved 
profitable in the past. By analyzing the relevant research on this topic, we can 
gain further insight into this theory, one which has been disputed by academic 
proponents of the random walk and efficient stock markets hypotheses. 
I. EVIDENCE OF THE CYCLE 
An examination of the historical rates of return of the stock market, classified 
according to the stages of the presidential cycle, clearly shows the dominance of 
neutral or "down" markets in the first half of a president's term and "up" markets 
in the second half. The data on stock market rates of return presented in Tables 
1 and 2 are derived from the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) on the last 
trading day of November. These figures have been computed using yearly percent-
age price changes in the DJIA, excluding dividends. 
Table 1 shows that since 1924, the Dow Jones Average has risen at only a 
l.Oo/o (geometric) average growth rate in the two years after a presidential elec-
Table 1 
Average Rates of Growth in the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
Over Selected Time Periods During the Presidential Cycle 
Returns based on Returns based on 
one-year periods two~year periods 
First year Second year Two years Year 
after after before before Two-year Two-year 
election election election election period period 
Time (year one (year two (year three (year four after before 
period of cycle) of cycle) of cycle) of cycle) election election 
1924 to 1982 
Avg. rate 0. 5% 0.5% 9.1% 7.1 o/o l.O o/o 15. 7o/o 
of return 
1943 to 1982 
Avg. rate -0.6% 0.8% 14.5% 9.3% 0.2% 24.0% 
of return 
1951 to 1982 
Avg. rate - 5.3% 0.3% 15.9% 9.4% - 5.0% 26.8% 
of return 
1962 to 1982 
Avg. rate -10.8% - 9.6% 13.9% 16.4% -17.6% 32. 5% 
of return 
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tion but at a 15. 7o/o growth rate in the two years prior to a presidential election. 
The cycle has grown even more pronounced in recent times. Since 1962, the Dow 
Jones Average has declined at a rate of 17.6o/o during the first half of a presi-
dent's term, and has risen at a rate of 32.5o/o during the second half. Further-
more, for the past forty years, the DJIA has always risen in the two-year period 
preceding presidential elections, with growth averaging 24o/o over the two-year 
periods. 
Other studies of the presidential election stock market cycle which have used 
the Standard and Poor's 500 Index (a much broader barometer of stock market 
activity) show similar results (Elias, 1982, p. 82). The results do not seem to be 
very sensitive to the choice of index since Lorie and Hamilton found a very close 
statistical relationship between the DJIA and the Standard and Poor's 500 Index1 
for the period 1926 to 1966 (Riley & Luksetich, 1980, p. 543). Moreover, the cycle 
does not appear to be affected by the party affiliation of the president, the only 
difference being a slightly better fit for the postelection down periods after 
Republican victories. Although the stock market movements are more pronounced 
in the two-year period after a Republican election victory, the latter half of the 
cycle is similar for both Democrats and Republicans. 
Since 1952, as Table 2 shows, during Republican administrations the DJIA 
has fallen by an average of 0.4o/o during the two years after an election, while 
under Democrats the index has risen at a rate of 2.5o/o for the two-year postelec-
tion periods. For the two years prior to elections, however, the index has grown 
at a rate of 21.4o/o during Republican administrations, and at a rate of 26.9o/o dur-
ing Democratic administrations. During every two-year period before the presiden-
tial election, the stock market apparently climbed slowly or receded early in the 
administration, then sped up as election time neared (Elias, 1982, p. 92). 
Returning to Table 1, we present data on the year-by-year average perform-
ance of the stock market during each of the four-year periods of a presidential 
term. The data show that the third year of a president's term is generally the 
strongest with respect to the growth of the stock market, with an average gain 
of 15.9o/o since 1951. It might be noted that the current year (1983) is the third 
year of the presidential cycle; therefore, investors can be reassured that the market 
has risen in each of the thirteen "third year of the cycle" periods over the past 
fifty years. 
On the other hand, the first year of a president's term has been historically 
bearish for the market, with an average annual loss of 5.3o/o since 1951. In fact, 
the stock market has fallen in the first year of every Republican administration 
since Calvin Coolidge (Vartan, 1982). However, an irregularity in the cycle arises, 
for Democrats have had weakly rising markets in the first half of their terms. 
Still other aspects of the cycle show that the relationship between presiden-
tial terms and the stock market may be more than coincidental. For example, since 
John F. Kennedy was president, the DJIA and the Standard and Poor's 500 have 
1The coefficient of correlation (r) was .98. 
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Table 2 
Average Rates of Growth in the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
Over Selected Time Periods During the Presidential Cycle 
Classified by Political Party 
Returns based on Returns based on 
one-year periods two-year periods 
First year Second year Two years Year 
after after before before Two-year Two-year 
election election election election period period 
Time (year one (year two (year three (year four after before 
period of cycle) of cycle) of cycle) of cycle) election election 
1924 to 1982 
Rep. admin. 
Avg. rate 
of return -6.4% 1.5% 5.3% 14.7% -4.9% 6.7% 
1932 to 1979 
Dem. admin. 
Avg. rate 
of return 6.9% -0.3% 11.7% -1.6% 6.5% 22.8% 
1952 to 1982 
Rep. admin. 
Avg. rate 
of return -10.8% 7.2% 21.0% 5.2% -0.4% 21.4% 
1948 to 1979 
Dem. admin. 
Avg. rate 
of return 6.4% 0.6% 10.9% 14.5% 2.5% 26.9% 
bottomed out in the second year of every administration (Elias, 1982). The August 
1982 stock market bottom under Reagan continued this trend. Conversely, since 
1960, the Dow Jones has peaked only in presidential election years (Elias, 1982). 
II. LINKS TO ECONOMIC POLICY 
By way of an explanation for these observed stock market tendencies, Robert 
Stovall (1974) of Dean Witter notes that every bear market since 1927 began dur-
ing the first half of presidential terms. Also, from 1927 to 1982, nine of eleven 
economic declines have begun in the first year of presidential terms. Stovall claims 
that the cycle has arisen since the "establishment and ascendancy of the Federal 
Reserve Board" (p. 154). He believes that the Fed tightens monetary policy in 
order to fight inflation during the first two years of a presidential term, the result 
being recession and unemployment-the voters' ''greater evil.'' The effect is lower 
levels of liquidity for stock purchases and capital goods spending, decreased fac-
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tory output, and lower earnings for corporations. Hence, the stock market falls. 
Stovall argues, however, that within the twelve calendar quarters prior to a 
presidential election, the Fed tends to cooperate with the President by following 
a more expansive monetary policy. This, along with the administration's tend-
ency to also pursue a more expansionary fiscal policy during this period, tends 
to boost the economy, and the stock market consequently rises. 
Other researchers have offered similar reasons to explain the causes of the 
presidential cycle. For example, Malabre (1977) finds that the first half of the 
presidential cycle is more pronounced under Republican presidents than under 
Democratic presidents because the former are more likely to accept recessions 
early in their administrations. Of the eight U.S. recessions since World War II, 
six have started with Republicans in the White House. Only the November 1948 
and February 1980 recessions occurred under Democratic administrations. A pos-
sible explanation for this phenomenon is that early in their terms Democratic 
presidents prefer to emphasize social programs that increase government spend-
ing, reduce unemployment, and stimulate the economy; on the other hand, the 
Republican presidents are more likely to accept a recession to reduce inflation 
through cutting the level of government spending. 
Martin N. Bailey notes that a major shift in U.S . macroeconomic policy seems 
to have occurred in the early 1960s. He notes that while all presidents have in-
tervened in the economy to some extent, John F. Kennedy was the first to pur-
sue overt and systematic policies aimed at controlling the aggregate level of 
economic activity (Allvine & O'Neil, 1980, p. 51). Likewise, Edward Tufte claims 
that since the early 1960s the economy has been managed so as to expand prior 
to an election and contract afterwards (Allvine & O'Neill, 1980). If there is in-
deed such a connection between economic policy and presidential elections, the 
cycle may exist simply because the markets are reflecting economic activity. 
A. Federal Reserve Independence 
Critics of the presidential election stock market cycle theory contend that the 
Federal Reserve System is independent and, therefore, unaffected by the political 
needs of presidents in setting monetary policy. However, others point to the fact 
that the chairman of the Federal Reserve System is appointed by the President 
and, being politically sensitive to the wishes of the President in economic mat-
ters, generally "gives the President what he wants" (Elias, 1982, p. 92). It has 
also been said that the Fed "gets special attention when interest rates are high 
and an election is approaching" (Fuerbringer, 1982). 
On the subject of the Fed and the timing of its monetary policy, Richard B. 
Hoey (1978) observes that "since the early 1950s, the money supply has gener-
ally slowed down after the presidential election. The exceptions were in 1961 and 
1977, when the victors in the election won by promising a more expansionary 
economic policy" (p. 194). He notes further that every credit crunch since 1962 
12 
has occurred in the first half of a presidential term. Ritter and Silber (1980, p. 
418) observe that since the 1960s there has been a rather clear cause-and-effect 
relationship between the general stance of monetary policy and movements in 
stock prices. They show that declines in stock prices were preceded by declines 
in the rate of growth of the money supply and vice versa. As Robert Stovall (197 4) 
explains: 
With a 9 to 12 month lag between expansion of the money supply and its 
effects on GNP and unemployment, the Fed has tended to reverse policy 
and to expand the money supply during the second year of presidential terms. 
(p. 154) 
This is a possible reason why the third year of a president's term has been so 
bullish. Stovall (1975, p. 92) says that the Fed has tended to follow an accom-
modating monetary policy in the 18 months prior to a presidential election with 
1960 being the sole exception. Similarly, Dick A. Stoken alleges that "each newly 
incumbent president has used the economic ammunition available to help him in-
sure that the period prior to the next election is a time of vigorous economic ex-
pansion ... which translates into a surging stock market two years before a 
presidential election" (Elias, 1982, p. 92). Ian McAvity adds that the pattern of 
expansion and contraction, which seems to have emerged in the late 1920s, became 
most evident. after 1960. Moreover, it has only been broken twice in fifty years: 
in 1940, when markets were disturbed by threat of war, and in 1960, when 
Eisenhower decided that he would rather fight inflation than help Nixon into the 
White House (Anderson, 1982, p. 60). 
B. The Political Business Cycle 
The rationale for managing economic policy in line with election periods for political 
gain has been the subject of recent academic inquiry. Duncan MacRae (1977) 
asserts that the business cycle is politically managed so as to lessen economic evils 
prior to a presidential election, with the goal of "vote-loss minimization." William 
Nordhaus (1975), a proponent of the notion of the political business cycle, believes 
that politicians take advantage of the so-called "Phillips Curve" inflation/unemploy-
ment trade-off in the short run. According to N ordhaus, voters are basically myopic 
and vote on the basis of actual economic conditions prior to the election relative 
to their expectations. As Nordhaus explains further, "Immediately after an elec-
tion, the victor will raise unemployment to some relatively high level in an austerity 
move to combat inflation (which was generated by the previous election dealings). 
As elections approach, the unemployment rate will be lowered to an optimal point 
(using economic expansion) by election eve" (p. 184). 
Further evidence of possible collusion between the Fed and the presidential 
administration for political purposes is provided by Tufte (Allvine & O'Neill, 1980). 
He dates the beginning of conscious attempts to tune the economic cycle to the 
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election date to Richard Nixon's 1960 campaign. Arthur Burns, then Fed chair-
man, allegedly warned Richard Nixon that unless President Eisenhower took ac-
tion to revive the economy, Nixon would lose the forthcoming election (Allvine 
& O'Neill, 1980, pp. 51-52). Convinced that Eisenhower's refusal to help him in 
1960 was responsible for his defeat, Nixon was intent on managing the economy 
to win the 1972 election. The sizeable monetary and fiscal boost given the economy 
by Nixon in 1970-71 to reach the re-election goal is alleged by some to be classic 
evidence of the true political nature of the Fed. The economy and stock market 
subsequently boomed, while prices were artificially stable under the wage-price 
controls instituted in August 1971. After Nixon was reelected, the controls were 
lifted and the rate of inflation escalated rapidly. The stock market then fell sharply 
while Burns applied monetary restraint, thus precipitating the 197 4 recession-
two years after the election. 
Other presidents also have learned that if the economy is not stimulated prior 
to an election, there is a good chance they will not be reelected. For example, 
Leonard Silk (1982) charges that in the 1976 election year Gerald Ford was at 
first hesistant to try to expand the economy. A panic about his reelection chances 
led to an outburst of monetary expansion, but by then it was too late and Ford 
lost the election (Newton, 1983). Jimmy Carter, upon taking office in 1977, pledged 
to fight unemployment by stimulating the economy. The resulting inflation led 
to the nomination of Paul Volker in 1979 to head the Federal Reserve System. 
By restraining the growth of the money supply, the Fed induced a recession in 
the 1980 election year. Carter was not reelected. 
The experiences of Ford and Carter strongly suggest that the pursuit of a 
contrary policy approach contributed to their failure to be reelected. Future pres-
idents may well realize the cost of neglecting the political business cycle. Since 
recessions in election years are not politically feasible, the incentive for business 
cycle management exists. 
The 1982 congressional elections again suggest how political actions by the 
Fed and the administration may have been used to appease voters prior to elec-
tions. A White House official has charged that President Reagan lined up new 
programs aimed at pleasing constituent groups "like a set of Chinese firecrackers 
... planning to pop off in succession in the days before the election" (Weisman, 
1982, p. D13). Similarly, one month before the election, the Federal Open Market 
Committee suddenly abandoned its targets for the money supply (Ml) for 
"technical" reasons. In the months before the November election, Ml had been 
growing rapidly, increasing at an annual rate of 19o/o, compared with the Fed's 
target range of 2.5o/o to 5.5o/o (Clark, 1982). Later, on the same day that the Fed 
was to announce the worst monthly unemployment rate in forty-two years (10.1 o/o) 
(King, 1982), the Fed cut the discount rate to 9.5o/o (Bennett, 1982). This drop 
in interest rates, combined with money supply measures well above target range, 
suggests that the Fed may have not only given the economy a "preelection jolt" 
which sent the stock market soaring, but also may have provided insurance that 
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expansionary monetary policy would be used to ensure a stronger economic 
recovery in 1983 and 1984-in time for the 1984 elections. 
Reagan's 1984 budget plan also appears to fit the political business cycle theory 
well. Leonard Silk has noted that the budget is designed to be stimulative for the 
next two years. Furthermore, when Treasury Secretary Donald Regan was asked 
at a budget briefing why the administration had put off its contingency tax in-
crease plan until late 1985, he replied that "1984 is an election year; need I say 
more?" (Silk, 1983, p. D2). Such events again suggest (but still do not prove) the 
existence of a politically managed business cycle, one which would explain the 
causes of the presidential cycle in stock prices. 
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR INVESTOR STRATEGY 
A. Criticisms of the Presidential Cycle Theory 
It should be noted that the presidential cycle theory is at odds with two widely-
held alternative theories of stock market behavior. First, the presidential cycle 
theory violates the popular theory that movements in stock prices are "random, 
unpredictable, and unexploitable" -the so-called random walk hypothesis (Allvine 
& O'Neill, 1980). To test the randomness of stock prices, Allvine and O'Neill used 
a statistical technique called "spectral analysis," one which is well suited for iden-
tifying recurrent patterns or cycles in time series data. They found a statistically 
significant 208 week (four year) cycle of stock prices (based on the Standard and 
Poor's 400) over the period from 1900 to 1978. This cycle coincides closely with 
the presidential election cycle and thus casts doubt upon the accuracy of the ran-
dom walk hypothesis. 
Another criticism of the presidential cycle theory of stock prices is that it is 
inconsistent with the "efficient markets hypothesis," another currently popular 
theory. This hypothesis suggests that over the long-run the return earned by in-
vestors who are holding a group of stocks should equal or exceed the return earned 
by investors trading stocks according to any trading rule (Allvine & O'Neill, 1980, 
p. 49). In essence, the efficient markets hypothesis suggests that investors can-
not profitably exploit the peaks and troughs of the presidential cycle. However, 
Allvine and O'Neill have tested a trading strategy which is based on the presidential 
cycle. With one exception, the strategy has proven profitable, a success record 
which leads them to doubt whether the stock market has performed in accordance 
with the efficient markets hypothesis since 1960. The strategy that Allvine and 
O'Neill tested was developed by David McNeil in 1973. The "switching" strategy, 
as it is called, consists of holding Treasury bills during the market downturn in 
the first two years of a president's term, and then shifting to an "index fund" 
of stocks during the market upturn in the last two years of a president's term. 
Over the period from 1962 to 1981, this "trading on the cycle" strategy has pro-
duced an average annual (compounded) return of 14.9o/o based on the Standard 
and Poor's 500 (Hoffman, 1982). This compares favorably with a return of 8.6o/o 
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on a "buy stocks and hold" strategy and a return of 5.9o/o on a "T-bills only" 
strategy. All vine and O'Neill found only slightly lower returns after including trans-
actions costs and taxes. However, they contend that the stock market is efficient 
in the long-run, since their trading strategy was less profitable than the buy-and-
hold strategy over the 1948 to 1978 period. 
B. Short-term Strategies 
There are still other aspects of presidential elections which present possible profit 
opportunities for investors. These, however, do not focus on four-year cycles, but 
rather on the three- to four-week periods immediately before and after presiden-
tial elections. Two such opportunities result from market direction and market 
volatility. 
In the case of market direction, several studies have shown that during the 
few weeks before and after presidential elections, the stock market "prefers" 
Republicans (Riley & Luksetich, 1980, p. 541). Niederhoffer, Gibbs and Bullock 
(1970) have tracked the course of presidential elections and the stock market over 
the period from 1900 to 1968. They found that the market tended to rise in the 
day, the week and the month immediately following a Republican victory and con-
versely tended to fall in the day, the week and the month following a Democratic 
victory (Riley & Luksetich, 1980). They also noted a direct relationship between 
the size of the change in the DJIA the day before the election and the size of the 
winning margin of the victor. Similarly, Reilly and Drzycimski found that for elec-
tions between 1940 and 1972 stock prices have generally risen in the weeks after 
presidential elections, with the largest increases occurring after Republican vic-
tories (Riley & Luksetich, 1980). Finally, the observations of Riley and Luksetich 
(1980, p. 553) have lent support to those of Niederhoffer, Gibbs and Bullock. Riley 
and Luksetich have hypothesized that the market "dislikes" uncertainty and thus 
declines prior to an election and rises after the election with the removal of un-
certainty. In addition, Riley and Luksetich have developed a set of short-term 
trading strategies based on their observations. I have simplified and summarized 
their strategies below: 
The first two trading rules require action on the assumption of perfect foresight 
about the election winner: 
1. If a Republican victory is anticipated, buy stocks one month before the elec-
tion and sell one month after. 
2. If a Democratic victory is anticipated, sell short one month before the elec-
tion and cover your position one month after the election. 
The last two trading rules require action on the basis of actual election results: 
3. If a Republican wins the election, buy the day after the election and sell one 
month later. 
4. If a Democrat wins the election, sell short the day after the election and cover 
one month later. 
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Riley and Luksetich have found these trading rules to be profitable under the 
assumption of zero transactions costs. Further study is needed, however, to see 
if these strategies can be profitably exploited after transactions costs are taken 
into account. 
As previously mentioned, another set of profit opportunities stemming from 
the election cycle involves market volatility. Riley and Luksetich (1980, p. 555) 
showed that the stock market exhibited significantly more variability during the 
few weeks before and after presidential elections (although the volatility was 
greater in the case of Republican victories than in Democratic victories). Since 
the risk/return framework suggests that risk rises with increased returns, the 
variability during these "profitable" periods should be greater than in similar 
nonelection periods, since variability is an extension of risk. The possible profit 
opportunities involve options strategies that become profitable in periods of in-
creased market volatility-such as election periods. The options could either in-
volve options on stock market index futures or options in "market-type" stocks 
(e.g., IBM or GM). The first possibility is the purchase of a straddle, where one 
buys a "call" (an option to buy a stock or index at a specified price) and buys a 
"put" (an option to sell the same) on the same stock or index. The key to prof-
itability is not the direction of the underlying stock, but increased volatility. The 
straddle should be purchased one month before the election and sold one month 
after the election. Alternatively, the purchase of a "butterfly spread," which also 
is based on volatility, might be considered. This strategy is much more complicated 
and involves the purchase of two call options on a stock or stock index at a "medium 
exercise price," and the simultaneous selling of both a "low exercise price" and 
a "high exercise price" call option. The exercise price is the price at which the 
underlying stock may be purchased or sold on or before the option's expiration 
date. 2 
These strategies may prove beneficial to short-term oriented traders, but they 
are also risky and involve much leverage. However, they are interesting from a 
theoretical viewpoint and warrant further research on the topic of presidential 
election stock movements and volatility. 
Interestingly enough, prior studies have shown that the market rises in the 
few weeks after a Republican victory, and falls in the few weeks after a Democratic 
victory. However, over the entire four-year cycle, we have seen that the stock 
market consistently performs much worse in the two years following a Republican 
victory than a Democratic victory. The jubilation of the market in the few weeks 
after a Republican victory (possibly because it is the party most in line with 
"business interests") is thus short-lived. 
2For a detailed look at options, see: Richard M. Bookstaber, Options Pricing and Strategies 
in Investing. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1981. 
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IV. THE CYCLE AS A "SELF-FULFILLING PROPHESY" 
Finally, aside from the political business cycle explanation, it may be that the 
presidential cycle exists simply because people have rational expectations that 
economic fine-tuning is taking place. Moreover, investors may simply move the 
market because they are informed of academic literature on the presidential cy-
cle and expect it to continue. For example, a widely reported feature in a recent 
Standard and Poor's "Outlook" (1982, p. 4 76) on the presidential cycle further 
increased public awareness of investing according to election periods and is be-
lieved to have added significant impetus to a major stock market advance in the 
three days after its distribution. The report showed that since 1950 the stock 
market has always risen in the 14-month periods following the midterm elections 
(e.g., 1982), regardless of the outcome. The article added that the average Octo-
ber 31 to December 31, 14-month gain was 24.4%. The report was distributed 
on the second day of a four-day rise which sent to DJIA from 995 to 1065. Analysts 
cannot determine how much of the record 43.41 DJIA advance on November 3, 
1982 resulted from the Standard and Poor's article. Hence, there might be a "self-
fulfilling prophesy" element about the presidential cycle. Information on the cy-
cle will be both immediately discounted in stock prices or ignored, only to be acted 
upon later. Consequently, there arises the question as to whether the cycle will 
be discounted much earlier as investor awareness and knowledge of the cycle in-
creases. Nevertheless, if economic conditions continue to improve before presiden-
tial elections and deteriorate afterwards, the cycle should recur in the future-
leading to further suspicion about a political business cycle that is managed to 
minimize vote loss. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
As we have seen, the presidential election stock market theory has been a power-
ful, yet imperfect, indicator of stock index movements since 1960, when the age 
of "political-economic fine-tuning" is alleged to have begun. Although this paper 
does not present concrete proof that there is a political nature to business cycles, 
the movements of the stock market and the economy both before and after elec-
tion periods may well be more than coincidence. The connection between monetary 
and fiscal policy, stock prices, and elections is an area that needs further study 
so that the link between policy and the cycle can be elucidated. Until the notion 
of a politically managed business cycle geared to election periods is formally 
disproved, however, investors should be aware of the cycle when making market 
timing decisions. 
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APPENDIX 
FURTHER OBSERVATIONS ON THE CYCLE 
WITH PREDICTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
A slight weakness in the cycle occurs in the two-year period after the presiden-
tial election, when markets should fall according to the theory. However, such 
declines occur most often during Republican administrations. Nevertheless, history 
has shown that the few instances of market rises in Democratic periods have been 
of relatively small magnitude compared to the gains seen in the two-year periods 
before the presidential elections. Investors should also notice that these two-year 
periods prove to be truly marked phases of the cycle that have occurred under 
both Democratic and Republican administrations since 1924. At the time of this 
writing, we are in this very phase as the 1984 election approaches. Hence, the 
theory predicts that the stock market will rise strongly until November 1984. 
Therefore, investors considering a "stocks and T -bills" strategy should now be 
fully invested in the stock market. 
A flaw in this strategy surfaced in 1982, however. Investors who held T-bills 
since November 1980 did well, as the market fell13o/o in the subsequent 21 months. 
Yet, these investors would have missed the market's explosive 29o/o three-month 
upward movement after August's 777 DJIA bottom. This surge gave the index 
a 13o/o gain in the two years after the 1980 election, which is contrary to the theory 
of the presidential cycle. However, this gain may seem small compared to the 
market rises we can expect in the next two years (1983-84) if the cycle behaves· 
as it has in the past. 
The presidential cycle looks bullishly on target for the period before the 1984 
election. As the theory would predict of a Republican administration, Ronald 
Reagan accepted the current recession in his first year in office-a period during 
which the Dow Jones fell10.5o/o. The Fed's current monetary expansion may well 
be evidence of the administration's goal of insuring an economic recovery in time 
for the next presidential election. In 1983, the third year of Reagan's term·, we 
should see a peak in unemployment, increased profit levels, and a much higher 
stock market-all favorable to voters. Fundamentally, economists are estimating 
that the forthcoming economic recovery will be relatively weak. However, in 
response to the length and severity of the current recession, some companies have 
cut unnecessary costs and closed inefficient plants, Hence, with higher net profit 
margins, U.S. corporations could show sharp earnings gains despite a slow 
recovery. The stock market, in turn, should rise sharply once these gains are real-
ized, possibly making this bullish phase of the presidential cycle self-fulfilling. 
In fact, the current positive presidential cycle stage shows only one aspect 
of what many Wall Street observers are calling one of the great bull markets since 
World War II. MIT Professor Franco Modigliani predicts the Dow could approach 
the 2,000 level by 1985 (Anderson, 1982, p. 60). He notes that the DJIA, adjusted 
for inflation, would have to more than double to equal its levels of a decade ago. 
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John Templeton, in a recent business telecast, noted that past bull markets peaked 
near the asset replacement value per share of the Dow Jones Average. He 
calculated 1, 700 as the current replacement value. Similarly, Arthur Merrill (Finan-
cial News Network, December 31, 1982) in his study of 17 bull markets since 1900, 
found that the average bull market rose 89o/o and lasted 28 months. Extrapola-
tion would thus put the Dow Jones Average at 1,469 in December 1984. The 
estimate may be high since the market trend has been upwards since 1900. 
However, the time frame would coincide with the presidential cycle notion that 
markets peak in presidential election years. The history of the presidential cycle 
since 1962 shows an average 32.5% DJIA rise in the two years before a presiden-
tial election. Using this, I thus forecast a DJIA of 1,300 by election day in 1984 
and believe the actual number will be in a range between 1,150 and 1,500, bar-
ring a Third World debt repudiation or an OPEC price-cutting war. 
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